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Abstract. This article analyses long-term energy contracts in relation with third-party 
access right to energy transmission and distribution system. Long-term energy supply contracts 
remain quite controversial: while enhancing the need to create competitive common energy 
market and to increase diversification of energy sources, the obligation to supply energy sources 
is contracted for a long time period with the appropriate contracted price. These contractual 
obligations are not reviewed or adjusted according to changing market conditions. A problem 
occurs because long-term energy contracts limit the possibility for new market participants to 
enter and compete with the existing ones. The transmission system owners often abuse their 
right to refuse grant third-party access using an argument of long-term energy supply contracts 
with take-or-pay obligations. There is a doubt if the capacity reservation mechanisms, take-
or-pay obligations and other limitations dealt in long-term contracts are in line with EU 
competition law requirements. However, long-term contracts provide stability of energy 
supply and also economic benefit to the consumer. The article analyzes long-term energy supply 
contracts perspective in the light of European Union competitive internal energy market.
Keywords: Long-term energy supply contracts, abuse of dominant position, take-or-pay 
obligation, third-party access, Third energy package, transmission network, European Union 
internal energy market.
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Introduction
Problems in energy market came to the outset when vertically integrated energy 
utilities exercised their dominant power in the market. Most experts agree that the 
energy market remains concentrated and dependant on dominant energy supplier. The 
European Union (hereinafter – the EU) adopted three energy packages1 which reflect 
ex ante regulation in order to create competitive common energy market and also to 
provide balance between security of energy supply ensuring third-party access to the 
transmission system2. However, undertakings may refuse to grant access if certain 
conditions are met, but long-term energy supply contracts with take-or-pay obligations 
put preconditions to abuse this right. According to the Directive, take-or-pay obligations3 
may cause serious financial and economical difficulties to the undertaking which is 
carrying out public service obligations.
 Long-term contracts relation with competition law has not been widely studied 
by the academic scholars. Hedge and Fjeldstad4 analysed several aspects of long-
term natural gas contracts. Economic analysis of energy supply contracts was given 
by Neumann and Hirschausen5. F. Leveque6 made valuable insights into antitrust 
enforcement in the energy market. However, there is still a lack of comprehensive 
legal research including intercourse between energy sector regulation requirements and 
competition law enforcement in the light of the EU internal energy market. 
The purpose of the research is to analyse long-term energy supply contracts in the 
perspective of common energy market as well as to evaluate the possible limitations, 
arising from contractual clauses, and correspondence with EU competition law.  
The object of the research is the ratio of long-term supply contracts with the EU 
energy market liberalization mechanisms and competition law.
1 The first energy law package includes: Gas Directive 98/30/EC, Electricity Directive 96/92/EC. The second 
package includes: Gas Directive 2003/55/EC, Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC. The third energy package 
includes: Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC, Gas Directive 2009/73/EC, as well as three regulations: On 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks (EC) No 715/2009; On conditions for access 
to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (EC) No 714/2009; Establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators ACER (EC) No 713/2009.
2 Directives 2009/73/EC and 2009/72/EC explain transmission activities as a natural gas / electricity trans-
portation via high-pressure piping / high voltage electrical network other than an upstream pipeline network 
and high-pressure pipelines primarily used in the local distribution of the natural gas in order to introduce 
them to consumers / distributors, with the exception of supply.
3 Take-or-pay obligation means that in the contract between the buyer and the seller there is set an appropri-
ate amount of energy sources, which will be taken for the contractually agreed price, regardless of whether 
the physical quantity is served, the buyer pays the seller a negotiated price.
4 Hedge, K. and Fjeldstad, E. The Future of  European Long-term Natural Gas Contracts. Oslo, 2010.
5 Neumann, A. and Hirschhausen, Ch. Less Long-Term Gas to Europe? A Quantitative Analysis of European 
Long-Term Gas Supply Contracts. Zeitschrift fur Energiewirtschaft. 2004, 28(3): 175-182.
6  Leveque, F. Antitrust Enforcement in the Electricity and Gas Industries: Problems and Solutions for the 
EU. The Electricity Journal. 2006, 19(5): 27-34.
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The research methods include the systematic analysis method7 used in an integrated 
way through the competition law analysis of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter – the CJEU) practice, the European Commission (hereinafter – the 
Commission) decisions and practical aspects of the application analysis to look at the 
energy sector, long-term energy contracts and to identify the most common problems. 
The application of this method is important to find an alternative as well as solving 
problems and understanding the unknown options by examining them. Comparative 
historical method8 helps to collate the relevant phenomena in different historical stages 
of development and fully discloses the origins of the problem and identifies the cause.
1. long-term Energy Supply contracts origins and  
contradictions
Long-term energy supply contracts are awarded to ensure major projects financing 
and they are also quite attractive for contracting parties - usually the seller - due to 
durations that range from fifteen to thirty years, since this period is optimal for 
incurred investment return. Assessing long-term energy infrastructure projects and 
particularly large initial investment and the subsequent period of lower operating costs 
for project developing companies, such contracts ensure stable investment returns 
through investment payback period, thus reducing the risk incurred by the energy 
project implementing company9. Retrospectively, in Europe long-term contracts with 
Russia (former Soviet Union) were contracted since 1970 to ensure that major energy 
infrastructure projects meet consumer demand for natural gas. The contracts were based 
on the so-called “Groningen model”, which was widely applied in the Netherlands since 
1962, when the return on investments was made for the whole period, while natural 
gas prices were determined in conjunction with other fuel price index.10 Changing 
situation in the natural gas markets as well as the development of technologies fostered 
to conclude long-term contracts for shorter periods. It is important to mention that the 
infrastructure investment needs gradually less money because the development of new 
projects mostly requires the improvements of existing system, also the technology price 
decreases. Competitiveness to some extent is enhanced by emerging spot market and 
energy trade exchanges. The development of alternative natural gas sources (Shale gas 
exploration processes in Poland, Hungary and Germany) reduce the need to ensure 
security only one way.
7 Tidikis, R. Socialinių mokslų tyrimų metodologija. [Social Sciences Research Methodology]. Lietuvos Tei-
sės universitetas, 2003.
8 Ibid., p. 30.
9 Smith, E.; Dzienkowski, J. et al. International Petroleum Transactions. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, 2010.
10 Konoplyanik, A. Gas Transit in Eurasia: Transit Issues between Russia and the European Union and the 
Role of the Energy Charter. Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law. 2009 (27/3): 445-483.
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Long-term energy supply contracts are quite controversial because of its benefits 
to market operators and potential conflicts to the competition law. On one hand, it 
ensures the security of energy supply as well as provides ability for suppliers to plan 
long-term investments that require significant financial resources in the energy sector. 
The main positive feature of the long-term energy supply contracts is the opportunity to 
buy long-term energy resource at a predetermined price formula, which at least should 
be legally protected from the larger fluctuations in the price and thus contribute to the 
security of energy supply. For this reason, long-term supply contracts to some extent 
are assessed as lower risk contracts. It should be noted that such contracts provide risk-
sharing mechanism between the buyer and the seller, which is mandatory according to 
high initial project investments. The long run investment return period preconditions 
price, energy demand fluctuations in the market and also certain political changes may 
result into modifications in the legal framework. Therefore, it is important to assess this 
risk and to provide certain “safeguards”. These contracts partially prevent the market 
from major price hikes and ensure a stable fixed price quotation. However, they create a 
situation, where the buyer and the seller are associated with long-term obligations11. The 
problem arises due to the fact that negotiations on the long-term supply contracts start 
two or three years prior to the transaction and the contracting parties after evaluation 
of future energy demand in the market for the long run shall provide the quantity of 
energy, which is planned to be acquired. Energy demand in the market may change and, 
therefore, a balanced amount of energy can actually render superfluous, but with the take-
or-pay obligation contracting parties do not adjust the agreed quantities to the changing 
market situation. On the other hand, the long-term supply contracts may be harmful, 
especially if they are awarded by dominant undertakings which make difficulties for 
new operators to enter the market12. After a certain period of time, fixed price in the 
long-term supply contracts often does not reflect the changing market trends, thus 
creates preconditions for market foreclosure. The Commission conducted an inquiry 
into the energy sector in 2007 and posted a Communication13, where it was stated that the 
energy market is still at a high level concentration, and poorly implemented unbundling 
requirement to vertically integrated companies still existed14. In this Communication, 
the Commission also stressed the importance to evaluate the vertical tying of markets 
by long-term contracts, since it is a risk that a dominant undertaking creates market 
distortions and may breach competition law implications. After a sector inquiry the 
Commission did not take any active measures for price regulation, since it would not 
affect market concentration or diminish market liquidity reasons, but only deal with the 
11 Neumann, A.; Hirschhausen, Ch. supra note 5.
12 Leveque, F. supra note 6.
13 Communication from the Commission. Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into 
the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report) COM (2006) 851.
14 Vertically integrated company pursuant to Directives 2009/73/EC and 2009/73/EC is the enterprise or group 
of undertakings where the same person or the same persons are entitled, directly or indirectly, to exercise 
control and where the undertaking or group of undertakings perform at least one of the transmission, 
distribution, LNG or storage and at least one of natural gas (in electricity) production and supply functions.
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consequences15. Subsequent Commission Communication16 states that the wholesale 
gas markets are still at a high level concentration, when the number of wholesalers has 
captured a 90% market share; the ownership unbundling vertically integrated utilities 
remains not implemented and also there is some discrepancy between de facto and de 
jure network capacity reservations. This means that the contracts are dealt with the 
network reservations, but physically the capacity remains not exhausted.
According to the Commission, long-term energy supply contracts should not 
create market leverage or hamper competition between operators. Monopolistic power 
companies with long-term contracts with take-or-pay obligations should not prevent 
competition in the market17. It is worth noting a few clauses used in long-term supply 
contracts: the destination clause, the oil price indexation and the take-or-pay obligation.
According to competition law, the destination clause is a kind of territorial 
restriction, where a purchaser of natural gas is prohibited to resell energy to other 
entities in a single country. Major producing companies sell products to distribution 
companies, but not directly to consumers. Sales are limited to the area, where supply 
companies have networks, and are not allowed to resell energy to other operators in 
the market in another area18. In this way, a condition prohibiting suppliers to resale 
purchased resources in another area, allowing the same product sold in different areas 
in the market price to different subjects, creates a market foreclosure effect. According 
to competition law, it is considered to be an exclusive purchasing, which is regarded as 
one of the forms of abuse of a dominant position. Some authors distinguish alternatives 
applicable to destination clause – the profit-sharing mechanism, under which the supplier 
undertakes to share the profits with the manufacturer for the resale of purchased products 
in another area. Such a profit-sharing mechanism with the supplier can be applied in 
cases, where production is used in purposes, which cause breach of the use restriction 
settled in the long-term contract19. An example is a situation, where electricity or heat 
energy producer in the production process using natural gas, which is purchased from 
a supplier, may not be used for other purposes, just as a fuel for electricity or thermal 
energy; the producer cannot sell the gas directly to the consumer. Such profit-sharing 
mechanisms, though usually as an alternative to territorial restrictions, create similar 
barriers to competition and may be likened to the territorial trade barriers and also 
breach the EU competition law.
Other long-term energy supply contracts condition is the oil price indexation. Oil 
price changes at the international market affects gas and electricity contractual prices, 
as the price of oil markets is used as a base price under long-term gas and electricity 
15 Energy sector competition inquiry – preliminary report. MEMO/06/78.
16 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Report on Progress in 
Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity Market COM (2010) 84.
17 Creti, A. and Villeneuve, B. Long-term Contracts and Take-or-Pay Clauses in Natural Gas Market. Energy 
Studies Review. 2004 (13, 1): 87.
18 Talus, K. Long-term Natural Gas Contracts and Antitrust Law in the European Union and the United States. 
Journal of World Energy Law and Business. 2011 (4, 3): 260-315.
19 Ibid.
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supply contracts. Oil, gas and electricity prices apply to a hypothetical possibility of a 
consumer to select the type of fuel20. Recently, after a significant increase of oil prices, 
this pricing model has reflected considerable discussion, as gas or electricity prices 
linking to the price of oil potentially creates some obstacles to diversify energy sources 
and thus potentially reduce the level of energy security supply. It should be mentioned 
that because of the increase in liquefied natural gas capacity and the development of 
unconventional gas (shale), gas trading hubs results into significantly lower prices21 
than the expected long-term contracts with the oil index-linked prices.
The take-or-pay obligation provides that long-term energy supply contracts are 
negotiated with a certain minimum amount of supplies, for which the buyer is obliged 
to pay a pre-negotiated price, regardless whether such amount is needed. It should be 
noted that this condition ensures a supply of energy stability and security, while also 
implies a certain risk-sharing mechanism22. On the other hand, such condition without 
free content preview options can be seen as a form of abuse of a dominant position. 
Accordingly, when the contracts with take-or-pay obligations also set the territorial 
and use restrictions, entities become bound by a long-term bilateral monopoly contract.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the long-term energy supply contracts 
contribute to the security of energy supply, create stability and reduce the risk of supply 
interruption, while promoting investment, especially when the project is risky. These 
contracts minimize the potential uncertainty of energy supply in the market. Also, the 
investment can be planned for longer periods23. On the other hand, the negative side 
of contracts should not be overshadowed, as they create a foreclosure effect, increase 
market concentration and reduce ex ante competition, since price changes in the 
markets do not reflect changes in the contracted price. Third energy package provides 
exemption for the third-party access to the network. Firstly, when the transmission 
network owners have entered into the long-term supply contracts with the take-or-
pay obligations and the reduction in the amount of resources incur significant losses, 
owners are allowed to refuse to grant the third-party access to the network. Secondly, 
the refusal to grant the third-party access is available because of insufficient capacity or 
the company’s obligation to provide public service.
1.1. Lithuania’s natural gas market overview:  long-term supply contracts  
   status quo and perspective
Lithuania is currently dependant on a sole external natural gas supplier from 
Russia. Such position of the external supplier is due to the fact that Lithuania’s natural 
20 Putting a Price on Energy: International Pricing Mechanisms for Oil and Gas. ECT secretariat, 2007. See 
also Stern, J. Is There a Rationale for the Continuing Link to Oil Product Prices in Continental European 
Long Term Contracts? OIES.6. 2007.
21 COM (2006) 851. supra note 13.
22 Hedge, K.; Fjeldstad, E. supra note 4.
23 Holt, D. The Long and Short of It: The Impact of Long-term Contracts as a Commercial Tool. Oxera. 
Agenda. 2007.
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gas system lacks interconnections with Europe to secure the so-called infrastructure 
standard (N-1).24 Also, there are no current measures to limit natural gas pricing, 
which creates overall price growth of Lithuania’s natural gas, electricity and heat. It 
should be noted that the Commission has launched an investigation of competition law 
infringement against the Russian company OAO “Gazprom”, related to the abuse of a 
dominant position. As noted in the Commission’s report, the investigation carried out 
OAO “Gazprom’s” actions, which affected the liberalization process and resulted into 
an unfair pricing.25 In this case, worth mentioning is the situation in the Lithuanian gas 
market, since the company AB “Lietuvos dujos” has entered into a long-term gas supply 
contract with OAO “Gazprom” until 2014. Lithuania issued a complaint against OAO 
“Gazprom” for LTL 5 billion overpayment for the supply of gas. In 2004, comprising 
AB “Lietuvos dujos” privatization contract, “Gazprom” obligated to supply natural gas 
to Lithuania due to gas price formula negotiated in the contract. However, considering 
the period between 2004 and 2012, gas price increased according to formula changes 
made in violation of the privatization contract. In 2012, July Arbitration Tribunal 
rejected “Gazprom’s” claims for damages26.
Law on Liquefied Natural Gas terminal (hereinafter - the LNG terminal)27 created 
legal prerequisites for the alternative natural gas supplies to secure the implementation 
of the so-called N-1 security standard, as well as minimize dependence on external 
natural gas supplier. It is worth noting that Lithuania lacks negotiating leverage in 
lower prices because it takes only 0.6 percent of a total OAO “Gazprom” Group’s gas 
production volume. For comparison, Latvia, with its gas storage Incukalns, and Estonia, 
using shale gas, find themselves in a better negotiating position on gas prices with an 
external natural gas supplier. Examining the long-term natural gas supply contracts, 
attention should be drawn to the price calculation, when OAO Gazprom supplies 
natural gas with the price linked to the oil price index. This pricing formula prevailed 
in 1980-2005 in Europe, when oil prices were relatively stable and satisfied natural gas 
consumers’ demand. However, when oil prices reached unprecedented heights, they 
became non competitive. Possibility to use alternative sources and formation of spot 
24 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 994/2010 on the gas supply security measures 
and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC [2010] OJ 2010 L 295/1. Article 6 requires Member States 
no later than 3 December, 2014 to ensure the natural gas infrastructure standard (N-1), must be satisfied 
with the overall demand for natural gas in the Territory, in case of the disruption of the single largest gas 
infrastructure of exceptionally high gas demand on the day, with a statistical probability of occurring once 
every 20 years.
25 Commission Opens Proceedings against Gazprom. 4 September, 2012, Commission Press Release, 
IP/12/937.
26 OAO Gazprom v. Republic of Lithuania. Final Award. 31 July, 2012. Arbitration No.: v. (125/2011) 
[interactive]. [assessed on  03-06-2013]. <http://arbitrations.ru/files/articles/uploaded/Gazprom_v_
Lithuania_Final_Award_SCC.pdf>.
27 Law on Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal of the Republic of Lithuania. Official Gazette. 2012, No. 68-3466. 
On 14 November, 2012 Parliamentary Group of the Republic of Lithuania asked the Constitutional Court 
to examine whether certain provisions of the Act and its implementing provisions of the decree of the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania is not in conflict with the Constitution. 2012.12.12 Constitutional 
Court returned part of the application to the applicant. File no.: 23/2012.
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market preconditioned possible price decreases. The spot market operates in the supply-
demand principle, when the price is fixed in the short term, taking into account the 
prevailing market prices, but also due to the excess volume of natural gas in the market, 
they can be sold in a competitive price without binding long-term commitments. On 
the other hand, the security of energy supply is not justified, since the need remains 
to ensure an uninterrupted supply. Formation of gas exchanges noticeably declines 
prices of natural gas, compared with the prices to the long-term contracts. After the 
development of natural gas exchanges in Great Britain, Holland, the USA or the long-
term supply contracts, linking prices not to the oil price index, but to the gas exchange 
indexes, the prices fall accordingly.
It should be noted that the LNG terminal contracts will be of mid-term (for about 
5 years) as well as short-term duration. This means that about 20-25% of all contracts 
will be mid-term gas supply contracts, the rest will be short-term supply contracts, 
which, as it has been already mentioned, have certain advantages on the spot market. 
Such contracts will be subject to diversification to balance stability, while maintaining 
the mid-term supply contracts ensure competitive prices for consumers, buying natural 
gas in the spot markets using the demand-supply principles.
1.2. Electricity market situation and supply contracts in lithuania
Electricity sector has undergone significant changes since 2010. Until then, a 
major part of the contracts were of long-term duration as well as all the production, 
transmission and supply activities were concentrated in the vertically integrated company 
AB “Lietuvos energija”. After Ignalina nuclear power plant closure, Lithuania became 
the importing country from the exporting electricity state. More than half consumed 
electricity is imported from neighbouring countries, mainly from Russia. Lithuania is 
also dependent on electricity produced using natural gas, which is imported from a 
single external supplier. The electricity transmission network is not connected to the 
continental European and Nordic networks. These connections are important to take 
advantage of the EU’s common energy market. Due to liberalisation requirements, AB 
“Lietuvos energija” was unbundled by separating transmission, supply and generation 
activities. Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) encouraged to build 
a competitive internal energy market in the region. Also, since 2010, when power 
exchange was launched, free electricity market has been developing in the country. It 
should be noted that in the current market there are independent suppliers who gradually 
take over customers from the distribution company LESTO. Attention is drawn to the 
fact that since 18 June, 2012 Lithuania has become a member of Nord Pool Spot.
The electricity produced by the AB “Lietuvos energija” is sold to public and 
independent suppliers as well as exported and traded in Lithuanian power exchange. 
Market liberalization process takes place in stages, where legal entities will have to 
choose independent electricity suppliers at different time, depending on the subject 
allowed capacity28.
28 Law on Electricity of Republic of Lithuania. Official Gazette. 2012, No. 17 752. Article 43 found that since 
1 January, 2013 public supplier must enter into contracts and to supply electricity to the public electricity 
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Since the beginning of 2010, for all users except households electricity price is 
calculated according to the new pricing, which clearly separates electricity cost from 
the transmission rates. Electricity transmission price is the same, regardless from whom 
a consumer is buying it, a public or an independent supplier. Each year, the service 
provider confirms the price, and the National Prices and Energy Control Commission 
publishes it. In conclusion, Lithuania has enacted the necessary legislation in the 
electricity sector and is implementing market liberalization mechanisms under the 
requirements of the Third Energy Package.
2. long-term Energy Supply contracts – the Reason to Refuse to 
Grant a Third-Party access?
European wholesale gas market is at a high level market concentration; the major 
part of natural gas is imported from several vendors under specific conditions. Almost 
40% of natural gas is imported from Russia and Algeria under long-term contracts, 
which increases market concentration and reduces conditions for new entrants. 
According to Directive 2009/72/EC and Directive 2009/73EC, businesses are entitled 
to refuse to grant a third-party access to the pipeline because of insufficient capacities 
or the existing take-or-pay obligations, presupposing serious financial and economic 
difficulties to the companies, which are implied by public service obligations. Refusal 
to grant access may be treated as a refusal to supply because the transmission network 
owner failing to allow another entity to use existing infrastructure restricts the latter to 
diversify resources and choose their supplier. Often, such a refusal to supply creates 
market foreclosure, when access is denied to the network connecting a number of 
countries, thus limiting the ability to supply alternative resources and maintaining the 
entity’s dominant position in the market.
 The refusal to supply as a form of abuse of a dominant position was first named in 
1972 Commercial Solvents29 case, which held that refusal to cooperate may be considered 
as  breach of Article 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter - TFEU). Legal doctrine explains that the dominant company refusing to 
cooperate with a competitor in the downstream market30 may infringe competition law, 
which means that all competition would be eliminated from the market. The Commercial 
Solvents case doctrine is usually applied to the dominant position in the market for 
vertically integrated companies, which supply essential resources in the downstream 
market31. In 1983, the Commission developed the refusal to the supply concept in the 
price for the entire license issued to the territory specified in the household customers who have not chosen 
an independent electricity supplier.
29 Commercial Solvents [1972] OL L 299/51.
30 Downstream market contracts are understood as “secondary market” contracts in which energy from the 
mining company or an external supplier acquired entities are sold to downstream transmission activities by 
traders, using bilateral long-term contracts or spot markets, so these energy resources are made  available to 
consumers.
31 Wish, R. Competition Law. 6 edition. Oxford, 2008.
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XIII32 report, which explained that objectively the refusal to supply is unjustified, when 
an entity supplies goods on the condition that it controls the processing of goods or 
sale33. The Commission submits to the interpretation that the refusal to supply is seen 
as the refusal to supply products to existing or new customers, as well as the refusal 
to license intellectual property rights, including cases where the license is necessary 
to provide information about the interface, or the refusal to allow use of essential 
equipment or network. As noted in the Commission’s Communication, unreasonable 
obligation to supply may particularly breach entity’s rights, and the Commission each 
time has to consider carefully the extent of its powers for the application of competition 
law in the area. Attention is drawn to the fact that the unreasonable obligation to supply 
may cause damage to the entity’s property rights. The right to choose business partners 
is widely recognized in Member States even as a constitutional principle34.
The obligation to supply may have a negative effect on investment as the dominant 
entity, avoiding situations where their competitors are obliged to provide access to the 
network. Also, they may refuse to invest in the infrastructure, thus, it may not only 
have a negative effect on the business, but also limit consumer’s right to get energy 
resources at competitive prices. A possible and lucrative situation, where the new entity 
seeks to enter the market, does not invest in equity of infrastructure development, but 
seeks to take an advantage of the work already done by the dominant market operator 
in the number of investments for the infrastructure development. In the long run, the 
dominant operator’s refusal to grant access has a positive effect because it promotes 
competition, when the operator seeks other alternatives to enter the market, thus 
creates a benefit to consumers, but in the short term, the obligation to grant access to 
the network creates the situation, where the entity will not be interested to invest in the 
energy infrastructure, but will desire to take the advantage of the existing infrastructure.
3. overview of long-term Energy Supply contracts case law
Long-term supply contracts do not breach Article 102 of the TFEU provisions, 
but in each case the Commission investigates whether the contracts contain certain 
conditions that violate Article 102 of the TFEU35 and every time the Commission 
evaluates the long-term contracts taking into account the long-term supply contract 
duration, company’s position in the market (whether it has a dominant position; 
32 XIIIth Report on Competition Policy (1983).
33 The following cases are related and examined more detailed refusal to supply in downstream markets: 
Case C-22/78 Hugin Kassaregister AB & Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v. Commission  [1979] ECR 1869; 
Joined cases C-241/91 and C-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd (ITP) v. Commission (Magill)  [1995] ECR I-00743; Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v. 
Commission (Tetra Pak II)  [1996] ECR I-5951; Case No IV/30.979 and 31.394 Decca Navigator System 
[1989] OJ L 43/27.
34 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zei-
tungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG and Others [1998] ECR I-07791, paras. 56-58.
35 Commission (EC), Antitrust: Commission Increaces Competition in the Belgian Gas Market – Frequently 
Asked Questions. MEMO 07/407.
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assesses its impact on the market) and the uniqueness of the contractual relationship, 
identifies the share of the market held by the company, and, finally, the effectiveness 
of the supply contracts. According to the case law, the company holding a dominant 
position in the market acquires a special responsibility to the extent seen in each 
situation36. The assessment of dominance is based on the following factors: pressure on 
supply of competitors and their market position, exposure to the possibility that future 
competitors expand or possible entrance opportunities of new competitors, pressure 
from the company’s customer bargaining power. The Commission believes that an 
action on Article 102 of the TFEU can be taken only after a careful evaluation of all the 
circumstances, because a company may be obliged to supply37. The refusal to supply 
also includes the company’s refusal to grant access right to the network38. When the 
dominant companies may be obliged to supply against their will, on average, they may 
refuse to invest or decide to invest less in their activity. Situations may arise, where 
the competitors use in vain the undertakings incurred investment for infrastructure 
networks improvement, avoiding potential obligations by investing in the network 
development. According to the Commission, the refusal to grant the right of access 
may lead to negative consequences: the refusal relates to a product that is objectively 
necessary for the company to compete in the market, the refusal diminishes effective 
competition in the market, and this refusal potentially causes harm to consumers.
Distrigaz case formed a long-term energy supply contracts limitation model39. In 
this case, the Commission reached a settlement with Distrigaz to agree on the new 
contracts with customers for duration up to 2 years and the contracts with industrial 
users for up to 5 years. It also provides a repealing condition, which means that if 
Distrigaz total share value falls more than 40% or the nearest competitor’s share rises 
more than 20%, this entity will not be subject to such requirements40. From 2007 until 
2010, Distrigaz committed to ensure that every year 65% to 70% of contracted volumes 
will return to the market, thus allowing other suppliers to make competing bids41.
In EDF case, the Commission also reached a settlement with the company, where 
the long-term contract with new customers would not exceed 5 years. The entity also 
obliged not to impose resale restrictions. From 1 January, 2010 until 31 December, 
36 Case C-322/81 Nederlandsche Banden Industrie (Michelin I) v. Commission (1983), ECR 3461, para. 
57; Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v. Commission (Tetra Pak II) (1993), ECR II-755, para. 114; Case T-111/96 
ITT Promedia v. Commission (1998), ECR II-2937, para. 139; Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar v. Commission 
(1999), ECR II-2969, para. 112 and  Case T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission (Michelin II) (2003), ECR. 
II-4071, para. 97.
37 Joined cases C-241/91 P and  C-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publi-
cations Ltd (ITP) v. Commission (Magill) (1995), ECR I-743, para. 50; Case C-418/01 IMS Health v. NDC 
Health (2004), ECR I-5039, para. 35; Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission (2007), ECR II-3601, paras. 
319, 330-332 and 336.
38 Commission Decision No 94/19/EB in Case IV/34.689 Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink – Interim Measures 
(OL L 15, 1994 1 18, p. 8) and Commission Decision No 92/213/EEB in Case IV/33.544 British Midland 
v. Aer Lingus (OL L 96, 1992 4 10, p. 34).
39 Distrigaz (Case COMP/37.966). Commission Decision of 11 October, 2007 [2007] OJ C9/5.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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2019 the EDF will ensure that 60% to 65% of the contracted volume will return to the 
market every year42. Harm of the long-term supply contracts occurs with an obligation 
to major energy consumers not to change a supplier for a longer period of time. In this 
way, other competitors are losing their right to facility access for a specified period. The 
problem arises when new entrants cannot enter the market and compete equally with 
the existing operators, as well as the smaller players face the potential risk of losing 
existing customers.
In RWE43 and ENI cases, the Commission held that the denial to grant third-
party access to the facility is harmful to consumers and competitors, when network 
access is necessary to act in the neighbouring markets, the refusal to grant access may 
abolish market competition in the neighbouring market. When network companies are 
vertically integrated utilities, they are interested to favour their own affiliates in the 
market, thus distorting the competition. The refusal to grant access to the market is 
often motivated by a number of reasons: lack of technical networks capacity, also the 
long-term supply contracts with producers. Restrictions denying access to the network 
are often considered justified when resulting from the company’s incurred investment 
costs in the development of the network infrastructure and are justified because of the 
payback period. RWE company’s refusal to provide access was motivated by capacity 
hoarding, inadequate capacity structure and the initial supply volume reservations. 
The Commission held that such network abuse was concerted by keeping capacity 
for its own supply business, especially for bottle necks. Secondly, the RWE imposed 
high transportation tariffs on the downstream, which prevented competitors from 
competing effectively44. In the ENI45 case, the company refused to grant capacity on 
transit pipelines from Germany and Austria and motivated the refusal to grant access 
rights with capacity reservation and already made investments into the infrastructure 
development. However, the Commission objected to the strategic underinvestment 
argument.
Worth mentioning is the German company E.ON Ruhrgas case. The national 
regulatory authority FCO (Federal Cartel Office) obligated the company to terminate 
the long-term contracts until 30 September, 200646. The new long-term supply contracts 
covering 80% to 100% distributor’s requirements shall not exceed 2 years period and the 
contracts covering 50% to 80% will not exceed 4 years. The E.ON appealed against the 
authority’s decision. The appellate court in this case agreed with the national regulator’s 
position that certain clauses were not in compliance with national law47. At the same 
42 Commission (EC). Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in 
case COMP/B-1/39.386-Long- term contracts. France [2007] OJ C262/32.
43 RWE Gas Closure (Case COMP/39.402). Commission Decision of 18 March, 2009. [2009] OJ C 133/8.
44 Ibid.
45 ENI Foreclosure (Case COMP 39.315).
46 Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt), 13 January, 2006, Decision B 8 – 113/03, E.ON  Ruhrgas 
[interactive]. [accessed on 25-05-2012]. <http//www.bundeskartelamt.de>.
47 Court of Appeal Dusseldorf (Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf), 20 June, 2006, VI-2 Kart 1/06 (V) – E.ON 
Ruhrgas [interactive]. [accessed on 25-05-2012]. <http://www.justiz.nrw.de>. 
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time, the court recognized that in the absence of the third-party access, the market 
remains closed. Vertical agreements restrict the competition between the E.ON and 
other gas suppliers and between the E.ON and large distribution network companies, 
which act as suppliers in the market. Contrary to the FCO’s decision, the court does 
not impose certain restrictions as a condition of 80% of purchases48. The E.ON makes 
several arguments to motivate clauses applied to this case. Firstly, the duration of the 
long-term contracts is questionable and should be similar to that used in the contracts 
with the take-or-pay obligations. In shorter agreements, the E.ON should assume all 
risk arising from the long-term contracts. It also argues that the restrictions can ensure 
low prices for a long period. The court did not justify the take-or-pay obligations in the 
long-term contracts with the need to ensure security of the supply in the market. The 
court also noted the decreased duration of the long-term contracts and in this case the 
company’s argument to pay off incurred investment is rather doubtful. 
It is worth noting that the long-term electricity supply contracts were limited to 
15 years, considering that this period did not create preconditions for the abuse of the 
dominant position and the market foreclosure, as nuclear power investment payback 
period is about 30 years. The Commission considers that this period is sufficient in 
view of investments return and continuing on competitive conditions in the market 
along with other operators49. In Scottish Nuclear, Nuclear Energy Agreement cases, the 
Commission held that the contract was set with the take-or-pay obligations, where the 
electricity produced by the nuclear power plant was sold under the long-term 30 year 
contract and was awarded to the two supply companies. The Commission reiterated its 
decisions in subsequent cases50, stating that the nuclear power electricity supply long-
term contracts should be no longer than 15 years. In those cases, the Commission found 
that the electricity supply contracts are awarded solely between the electricity producers 
and the monopolistic generation companies, and when they are awarded, the market 
remains closed for a long period. Another case, in which the Commission assessed the 
long-term electricity supply contracts, is REN / Turbogas51, when a compromise was 
reached on the pricing periods, when for the first fifteen years the generator set higher 
prices, and for the remaining period lower electricity sales prices were negotiated. It is 
worth noting that in the Commission’s decision in ISAB Energy52 case, the twenty-year 
long-term contract has not been cancelled, but the Commission saved the reservation 
after fifteen years to check on the market functioning. The Commission’s position on the 
nuclear power plants generated electricity supply contract is a compromise in a sense, 
that such contracts are necessary to ensure long-term security of the energy supply, and 
secure the massive investment return of nuclear energy infrastructure installation.
48 Court of Appeal Dusseldorf (Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf), supra note 47.
49 (EEC) 91/329; Commission Decision of 30 April, 1991 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty (IV/33.473 – Scottish Nuclear, Nuclear Energy Agreement).
50 Electricidade de Portugal/Pego Project (Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17) [1993] OJ 
C265/3.
51 REN/Turbogas (Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17) [1996] OJ C118/7.
52 ISAB Energy (Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17) [1996] OJ C138/3.
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conclusions
1. Limitations to use network are understood as one of the forms of abuse of a 
dominant position. Quite often, there are situations, where a dominant network company 
conducting energy transmission activities unreasonably refuses to grant network access 
for other operators. In this way, a vertically integrated company has a significant 
leverage and artificially creates barriers for other operators to enter the market and thus 
keeps the bulk of the supply market.
2. A Commission study on the mismatch of competition law settled respective 
obligations to natural gas companies with a dominant position in the market, limiting 
long-term supply contracts for the maximum term, including other requirements. The 
long-term contracts per se do not presuppose the breach of competition law, however, 
certain contractual clauses, such as the take-or-pay obligation, use restrictions and the 
destination clause, which are implemented by an undertaking, shows that holding a 
dominant position brings up market distortions, which leads to the foreclosure effect.  
3. The long-term energy supply contracts are an important factor to ensure the 
incurred energy infrastructure installation costs payback. In this way, relevant major 
energy infrastructure (gas, oil, nuclear energy) project funding stability is ensured. It 
would be useful to draw attention to the company’s incurred costs to the infrastructure 
investment and mandatory investment return time. Therefore, in addition to the contracts 
duration, a periodic review of its terms and conditions and also more flexible price 
review options considering the changing market conditions, thus maintaining need for 
operators to continue receiving a negotiated amount of energy, should be included.
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IlGalaIkIų ENERGIjoS tIEkImo SutaRČIų PERSPEktYVa  
EuRoPoS SĄjuNGoS koNkuRENcIjoS tEISĖS koNtEkStE
Laura Rimšaitė
Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva
Santrauka. Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjamas energetikos sektoriuje vyraujančių ilgalai-
kių tiekimo sutarčių santykis su trečiųjų šalių prieigos teise. Ilgalaikės energijos tiekimo sutar-
tys kelia nemažai problemų, siekiant sukurti rinkos konkurencingumą, padidinti energijos 
išteklių diversifikavimą, kadangi pagal sutartį paprastai yra įsipareigojama ilgam laikotar-
piui tiekti atitinkamą kiekį energijos išteklių, už kurį yra suderama mokėti tam tikrą kainą, 
šiose sutartyse numatomi energijos tiekimo kiekiai nėra peržiūrimi pagal rinkos tendencijas. 
Esminė problema kyla dėl to, kad vyraujant ilgalaikėms tiekimo sutartims, naujiems ūkio 
subjektams tampa sudėtinga patekti į rinką, o perdavimo tinklų savininkai neretai pikt-
naudžiauja direktyvose numatyta galimybe atsisakyti suteikti prieigos teisę, motyvuodami 
turimomis ilgalaikio tiekimo sutartimis su imk arba mokėk išlyga. Konkurencijos teisės as-
pektu kyla klausimų ir dėl kitų ilgalaikėse tiekimo sutartyse numatomų apribojimų, rinkos 
pasidalijimo mechanizmų bei pajėgumų rezervacijų. Kartu reikia pažymėti, kad ilgalaikės 
energijos išteklių tiekimo sutartys yra energijos tiekimo saugumo bei stabilumo užtikrinimo 
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garantas. Straipsnyje analizuojamas minėtų sutarčių prieštaringumas bei jų tolesnė perspek-
tyva konkurencingos Europos Sąjungos energetikos rinkos sukūrimo kontekste. 
Trečiųjų šalių prieigos teisė prie tinklų, kuri numatyta dujų bei elektros direktyvose, su-
kuria prielaidas konkurencingos vidaus rinkos energetikos sektoriuje sukūrimui, tačiau kartu 
šiose direktyvose yra numatytos leidžiančios nukrypti nuostatos, t. y. nepakankami tinklų 
pajėgumai, su viešųjų paslaugų teikimu susijusios pajėgumų rezervacijos, imk arba mokėk 
išlygos taikymas ilgalaikėse sutartyse, kurios nesilaikymas suponuotų didelius finansinius 
nuostolius perdavimo tinklų bendrovei. Tokiomis teisėmis neretai piktnaudžiauja perdavi-
mo tinklų bendrovės.
Ilgalaikės energijos tiekimo sutartys yra svarbus veiksnys, siekiant užtikrinti energeti-
kos sektoriuje patiriamų didelių pradinių investicijų, skirtų infrastruktūros įrengimui, atsi-
perkamumą. Tai ypač aktualu naujų dujotiekių, naftos ar branduolinių energetikos infra-
struktūros projektų finansavimo stabilumui užtikrinti. Svarbu, kad šiomis sutartimis nebūtų 
sukuriamos išskirtinai palankesnės sąlygos minėtiems subjektams, todėl reikėtų vertinti būti-
nąjį investicijų atsiperkamumo laikotarpį, kuriam vis dėlto galėtų būti užtikrinama patirtų 
investicijų grąža numatomomis ilgalaikėmis sutartimis.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: ilgalaikės energijos tiekimo sutartys, piktnaudžiavimas domi-
nuojančia padėtimi, imk arba mokėk išlyga, trečiųjų šalių prieigos teisė, Trečiasis energetikos 
paketas, perdavimo tinklai, Europos Sąjungos energetikos vidaus rinka.
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